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ABSTRACT
Vaidya, Abhishek. MSAA, Purdue University, May 2016. Unsupervised Learning
Framework for Large-Scale Flight Data Analysis of Cockpit Human Machine Interaction Issues. Major Professor: Inseok Hwang.

As the level of automation within an aircraft increases, the interactions between the
pilot and autopilot play a crucial role in its proper operation. Issues with human machine
interactions (HMI) have been cited as one of the main causes behind many aviation
accidents. Due to the complexity of such interactions, it is challenging to identify all
possible situations and develop the necessary contingencies. In this thesis, we propose
a data-driven analysis tool to identify potential HMI issues in large-scale Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) dataset. The proposed tool is developed using a
multi-level clustering framework, where a set of basic clustering techniques are combined with a consensus-based approach to group HMI events and create a data-driven
model from the FOQA data. The proposed framework is able to effectively compress a
large dataset into a small set of representative clusters within a data-driven model, enabling subject matter experts to effectively investigate identified potential HMI issues.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Advances in flight automation have reallocated aircraft operations away from the
pilots, consequently moving them into a supervisory role within the cockpit [1]. The
ritualistic efficiency of autopilot systems has brought about sweeping improvements in
safe operations of aircraft; however, effective interactions between the pilot and autopilot are paramount for this claim to hold true. In many aviation accidents, investigators
have identified improper human machine interactions (HMI) as the source of the calamity [2, 3]. While HMI issues may occur due to a range of reasons, each case is characterized by the basic principle that the automation and the operator intend to perform
different actions [4, 5]. While formal model checking tools are used during the development of autopilot systems, it is not feasible for such tools to identify all the problems
stemming from HMI issues for two main reasons [6, 7]: First, due to the complexity of
a pilot’s decision making process, it is challenging to identify and check for all points
of interaction between the pilot and autopilot. Second, since automation logic is defined
in discrete states, it is challenging to incorporate the impacts of continuous flight states
(i.e. altitude, speed, heading, etc.) in model checkers [8, 9]. Due to the difficulty of
using model checking techniques to identify sources of HMI issues, research has also
been conducted in taking data driven approaches to identify HMI issues via anomaly
detection [1-16]. By looking at large-scale flight dataset, these techniques attempt to
find unusual trends in flight data. Via the identification of anomalies in regular flights,
it may be possible to recognize instances of HMI issues. While such instances may not
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have caused a safety related issue, by identifying and correcting them it may be possible
to deter future risk of incidents. The objective of this thesis is to develop a new datadriven tool based on data mining techniques to 1) detect HMI issues from a large-scale
flight data, 2) classify the detected HMI issues along their characteristics, and 3) build
a model describing the patterns of the classified HMI issues.
This thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 1, the approach used to identify conflicts is detailed and intent conflicts observed in FOQA data discussed. Chapter 1 describes the clustering process proposed to effectively group intent conflict data. The
process to represent clustered intent conflict data as a data-driven model is outlined in
Chapter 1. The analysis results from applying the proposed algorithms to FOQA data
are presented in Chapter 1. The conclusions are discussed in Chapter 1.

1.1

Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) Program

The FOQA program was first introduced by the FAA in 2004 as a way to improve
the safety of the commercial airline industry via the voluntary sharing of de-identified
flight data [10]. The flight data submitted to the FOQA program is the detailed flight
information that is recorded on a Flight Data Recorder (FDR) or a Quick Access Recorder (QAR). As per the program guidelines, the minimum flight parameters that need
to be submitted are equivalent to the mandated requirements for FDRs [11, 12]. In the
most general sense recorded data can be of two types, continuous or discrete. Continuous state data represent time varying parameters such as flight speed, heading, roll rate,
etc. Discrete state data represent categorical states such as autopilot modes, button
presses, switch positions, etc. Due to the high rates of participation and the depth of the
collected data, a number of techniques have been developed to analyze FOQA data.
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The next subsection will go into some of the methods that have been developed to analyze FOQA data for the purpose of identifying anomalous behavior including HMI
issues. For the purpose of this thesis, FOQA data from 151,083 flights in NASA’s
DASHlink database is analyzed.

1.2

Review of Related Work

The most direct approach for identifying anomalous behavior in FOQA data, outlined in [1], is to first identify ranges in flight parameters for nominal behavior during
a flight and detect outliers that fall outside normal operational bounds. Such an approach uses simple clustering analysis to identify the outlying flights based on the assumption that the majority of the flights within the dataset are normal. While this
method is effective in identifying anomalous flights, this process is limited to flights
that share similar flight plans and aircraft properties; hence, it must be individually applied to different routes, aircraft types, weather conditions, etc. Additionally, this approach will only able to find anomalous behavior at a macro scale, thus overlooking
small inconsistencies in flight parameters or intermittent issues of short duration which
do not cause a major variation in the overall flight. Furthermore, this approach can analyze only continuous flight parameters, excluding discrete state information critical to
understanding HMI events.
An alternate approach, used in [14], analyzes sequences of discrete states to identify
anomalous behavior. Contrary to the previous approach, clustering techniques are applied to only the discrete sequences in flight data (i.e. autopilot modes or pilot interactions) to identify nominal sequences of discrete states. Flights containing any abnormal
sequence of events, and the associated aberrant parameter sequences, can be identified.
This approach is limited to examining similar flights and aircraft as discrete sequences

4
can vary greatly depending on the route, airports, and equipment. This approach can
indeed identify inconsistences in the pilot or autopilot discrete actions but is unable to
couple them with other continuous flight parameters.
The algorithm discussed in [15] incorporates discrete state information along with
continuous data to identify anomalous flights using their proposed Multiple Kernel
Anomaly Detection (MKAD) algorithm. The MKAD is able to combine information
from both continuous and discrete states, which enables it to account for the more complex behavior of the pilot and autopilot when identifying anomalies. That being said,
this approach also uses the concept of nominal behavior to identify outliers, limiting
the type of flights that can be analyzed together and the scope of the analysis results.
Rather than looking at anomalies in overall flights, our earlier work [16] suggests
the use of an intent model to identify HMI issues during instances of a flight. Anomalous behavior is detected within the flight data by first inferring the intent of the pilot
and the autopilot. An intent conflict is said to have taken place if there is a mismatch in
the pilot’s and autopilot’s intents, i.e. the pilot and the autopilot are attempting to perform disparate actions. As this approach looks at flight data one flight at a time using
an intent model, the anomalies detected are independent of each other. This allows the
algorithm to process different types of aircraft and is not limited to a set of similar
flights with comparable flight plans.
With any of the techniques discussed above, the detected anomalies are not guaranteed to be HMI events. To identify an anomaly as an HMI issue, it must be examined
by an SME and confirmed as such. The intent based anomaly detection technique, discussed in [16], attempts to target HMI events by specializing on the type of anomalies
to look for. Since intents are identified by building models of the pilot and the autopilot,
anomalies detected in such a manner have an advantage over the previously discussed
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blanket approaches. Rather than statistical anomalous behavior, intent conflicts represent behavior that is aberrant as a result of pilot and autopilot actions during the flight.
Therefore, identified intent conflicts represent anomalies that are more likely to be related to HMI events. However, while this intent based approach can detect instances of
potential HMI issues, it is unable to provide trends and causes behind the issues. For
the remainder of this thesis, the algorithm outlined in [16] is referred to as the intent
conflict detection algorithm.

1.3

Motivations

When the intent conflict detection algorithm [16] is applied to a large-scale FOQA
data set, a large number of intent conflict events are detected. Due to the variations in
the complex nature of HMI events, it is challenging to analyze and isolate the source of
the intent conflict algorithmically. To identify the causality that resulted in each of these
events, they must be analyzed by subject matter experts (SMEs). However, due to the
substantial size of the intent conflict dataset, manual examination by experts is infeasible.
In this thesis, we propose techniques that can process large sets of event data and
make it possible for experts to analyze such events efficiently as a group. We suggest
the use of clustering techniques to analyze this intent conflict data and propose a multistep clustering method to achieve this. By identifying trends and patterns in intent conflict events, we aim to systematically reduce the amount of intent conflict data that must
be examined by SMEs as they attempt to discover the causality behind intent conflicts.
The proposed framework is built upon a consensus clustering approach [17], traditionally used to combine and improve results of other clustering algorithms [18]. In this
thesis, we propose a new framework for applying consensus clustering to effectively
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and efficiently group and characterize intent conflict events. The proposed approach is
able to incorporate both discrete and continuous state information.
Owing to the sheer number of aircraft that are flown on a daily basis, an increasing
number of intent conflict events may be occurring. Therefore, it is important that intent
conflict events are actively tracked and managed. To enable this, we also propose the
creation of a structured data-based model that can adapt to and be updated with new
flight data. This model structures the intent conflict clusters, obtained by the proposed
consensus clustering algorithm, into networks. As new data is added to the system, the
network is able to evolve based on the creation of new nodes and links. The proposed
clustering and modeling techniques can be used to build useful clusters based on trends
identified among intent conflict events. Additionally, this results in a significantly more
manageable size of data for manual examination, making it possible for SMEs to efficiently evaluate intent conflict events.
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2.

INTENT BASED HMI DETECTION

This chapter briefly reviews the intent conflict detection approach that we have developed in [16]. The FOQA data is processed by the intent conflict detection algorithm
to identify instances in flight where intent conflicts occur.
The algorithm first models the behaviors of the pilot and autopilot using a set of
flight intents. For example, the flight intents can be climb, descend or maintain altitude
in the vertical dimension; turn left, turn right or maintain heading in the horizontal dimension; and speed up, slow down or maintain speed in the speed dimension. Then, the
algorithm uses intent inference techniques to infer the flight intents of the pilot and
autopilot from the given FOQA data. An instant of intent conflict is then said to occur
when the inferred intents of the of the pilot and autopilot do not align, and can occur in
a range of manners as illustrated in Figure 2-1, and elaborated in section 1.1. In the first
case of Figure 2-1, an intent conflict occurs because the autopilot enters the altitude
hold state temporarily. In the second case, an intent conflict occurs due to a delay in the
pilot for changing the intent from descend to hold. In the third scenario, the pilot intends
to climb while the autopilot descend.

Figure 2-1. Different types of intent conflicts in the vertical dimension
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2.1

Types of Intent Conflicts

The intent conflict algorithm detects intent conflicts by inferring the intents of the
pilot and the autopilot. Any disagreements between these two intents are identified as
intent conflicts. By analyzing how the intents of the pilot and the autopilot change relative to each other during a conflict, intent conflicts can be divided into four types:
Type 1: These intent conflicts arise from a momentary deviation of the intent of either
the pilot or the automation while the other maintains a steady intent before,
during and after the conflict. When the pilot intent deviates, it is called a Type
1a conflict while a deviation in the automation intent results in a Type 1b conflict.
Type 2: These intent conflicts arise when both the pilot and the automation make the
same change in the intent but at different times. Thus, these intent conflicts
arise from a delayed action of either the pilot or the automation. A delay in
intent change by the pilot causes a Type 2a conflict while an automation delay
causes a Type 2b conflict.
Type 3: These intent conflicts arise when both the pilot and the automation make a
change in the intent, however, the new intents of the pilot and the automation
are not the same.
Type 4: This type of intent conflict is said to have happened when a sequence of the
previous types of intent conflicts happen in quick succession.
The examples of each conflict type are presented in Figure 2-2 and the distribution of
the conflict types are shown in Figure 2-3.
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Figure 2-2. Intent conflict types (1: Climb, 0: Constant Altitude, -1: Descend)

Figure 2-3. Distribution of intent conflict types in the vertical dimension

2.2

Statistical Filtering

It is discovered that a large number of the intent conflict events are of a very short
duration and likely to be a result of noise in the data or artifacts of the intent conflict
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algorithm. A short duration event is highly unlikely to represent a true intent conflict,
and more likely a spurious data point.
While the existence of these spurious intent conflicts would not affect the workings
of the clustering process itself, it may severely skew the results and oversaturate the
final model with junk clusters. As such a simple duration based statistical cutoff is proposed to filter these short duration events from the data pool. Looking back at the distribution of the conflict types (Figure 2-3), Type 1 and Type 2 make up the majority of
the intent conflicts. Type 3 intent conflicts happen too infrequently due to the unconventional changes in the pilot and autopilot intents. One the other hand, Type 4 intent
conflicts denote complex combination of intent changes and are also observed relatively
infrequently. As such, Type 1 and Type 2 intent conflicts are most likely to harbor the
majority of spurious intent conflict data and thus are of interest for the further filtering
analysis.
2.2.1

Duration Analysis of Types 1 & 2 Intent Conflicts in the Vertical Dimension

The majority of the intent conflicts of Types 1 and 2 persist for a very short duration.
Figure 2-4 shows the statistical distribution of intent conflict duration across the set of
tail numbers in the database. It can be seen that for all the cases, the vast majority of
the intent conflicts are of very short duration and show an exponential-type decay in
frequency with increasing duration.
The high frequency of short-duration intent conflicts suggests that these intent conflicts may not be ‘true’ intent conflicts but rather artifacts of the intent conflict algorithm and noise. While there is no way to correctly eliminate all the spurious results,
statistical analysis can be applied to identify an upper bound (cutoff value) in duration
under which all intent conflicts can be considered as spurious. This filtering process is
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based on the assumption that short duration intent conflicts are unlikely to be real safety
critical HMI issues and that it would take a moderate period of time before an HMI
issue would become dangerous. Similar trends are seen within the horizontal dimensions. The methods discussed here are also applied towards intent conflicts in these
dimensions.

Figure 2-4. Statistical distribution of the length (in seconds) of intent conflicts in the vertical dimension

2.2.2

Identification of Duration Cutoff

Since there is a variation in the distribution of intent conflicts in different tail numbers, intent conflicts from different tail numbers must be filtered separately to ensure
statistical consistency. In this section, the process of identifying the cutoff point for
vertical dimension intent conflicts for Tail #611 is discussed as an example. The process
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can be repeated for the rest of the tail numbers in the dataset, and the horizontal dimension.
For tail #661, a total of 30,913 intent conflicts were observed in the vertical dimension. The statistics of these intent conflicts are shown in Table 2-1. Due to the long tailtype distribution (as shown in Figure 2-4), this data is highly skewed therefore resulting
in a large difference between the mean and the median and extremely high standard
deviations.
To determine an appropriate cutoff value under which the identified intent conflicts
are considered spurious, we first identify long-duration intent conflicts from the distribution to alleviate the severe skewness. In this analysis, we assume that intent conflicts
longer than 15 seconds could be caused by pilot-automation interaction issues and result
in safety problems, and therefore, exclude them in the cutoff value searching process.
The resulting less skewed distribution is summarized in Table 2-2.
Table 2-1. Durations statics of intent conflicts in vertical dimension for Tail #661
Conflict Type

Frequency (number)

Median
(seconds)

Mean
(seconds)

Standard Deviation
(seconds)

1a
1b
2a
2b
3
4

2,067
610
1,933
25,888
82
333

5
7
5
3
14
12

70.62
14.64
57.66
13.26
27.62
34.40

113.42
76.65
174.65
42.17
29.78
77.26

Table 2-2. Durations statics of intent conflicts in vertical dimension for Tail #661
(For intent conflicts with durations shorter than 15 seconds)
Conflict Type
1a
1b
2a
2b

Frequency
(number)
819
490
1,399
22,356

% of
original
39.62
80.33
72.37
86.36

Median
(seconds)
6
6
3
3

Mean
(seconds)
6.38
6.26
4.38
4.13

Standard Deviation
(seconds)
4.39
3.76
3.48
3.57
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Comparing to the original statistics (as in Table 2-1), the filtered distribution is less
skewed, and the difference between the mean and median is not severe, which allows a
better analysis for the cutoff value searching. Due to the top heavy distribution of Type
2 intent conflicts (see Figure 2-4), the cutoff point was selected to be 2σ above the mean
value while the cutoff point for Type 1 conflicts was selected to be 1σ above the mean.
By using these cutoffs, we are able to significantly reduce the number of intent conflicts
that must be clustered and need to be examined by SMEs.
Table 2-3. Cutoff duration for vertical dimension Type 1 and 2 intent conflicts of Tail #661
Conflict Type
1a
1b
2a
2b
-

2.2.3

Cutoff
≤ mean + σ
≤ mean + σ
≤ mean + 2σ
≤ mean + 2σ
-

Cutoff Duration (seconds)
10
10
11
11
-

# eliminated
643
412
1,304
20,872
23,231

% eliminated
31.1
67.54
67.46
80.62
75.15

Example of Filtered Intent Conflict Data

In Figure 2-5, we show the vertical flight data for a single flight and illustrate how
the filtering process can eliminate the majority of the spurious intent conflicts. Out of
the 11 intent conflicts originally detected, only one remained. Figure 2-6 shows the
detailed view of three intent conflicts among the 11 intent conflicts.
The first intent conflict shown to the left in Figure 2-6, classified as Type 2b, happens
due to a delay in the change of the automation’s intent (‘descent’ to ‘altitude hold’) and
last for a duration of 5 seconds. The pilot’s intent changes from ‘descent’ to ‘altitude
hold’ as the aircraft approaches the MCP target altitude previously selected. The automation’s intent is not changed until the VMODE switches from 1 (Altitude Auto) to 2
(Altitude Hold) when it is finally captured at the selected altitude. It can be concluded
that this intent conflict is an artifact of the intent conflict detection algorithm where the
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threshold for the pilot’s autonomous intent change (i.e., from ‘descent’ to ‘altitude
hold’) affects the magnitude of the delays.
In the second intent conflict, the pilot selects a new MCP altitude target, causing a
change in the pilot’s intent from ‘altitude hold’ to ‘descent’. There is a short delay, 2
seconds, in the change of the automation’s intent. This delay could be due to the time
needed for the automation to react to the pilot’s command, which is usually short. So,
it can be concluded that this particular intent conflict is a part of normal operation, and
thus rightly filtered out.
In the third intent conflict (highlighted green), the Type 1 intent conflicts lasts for a
duration of 14 seconds and is a result of the momentary change in the pilot’s intent to
‘altitude hold’. However, from the altitude and the VMODE data, it can be seen that
the automation never acknowledged the MCP setting of 2,000 feet and continued descending. The intent conflict ended when the pilot changed the MCP target to 0 ft. Since
this intent conflict happens right before landing, it is possible that the automation is
configured for auto-land and not following the pilot’s command. However, using just
the FOQA data, it is not possible to directly come to this conclusion.

15

Figure 2-5. Results of the filtering process when applied to a complete flight
The filtered conflicts are shaded black while the remaining ‘valid intent conflicts’ are shaded
green

Figure 2-6. Detailed view of intent conflicts shown in Figure 2-5

From the above analysis, we can see that the spurious intent conflicts (i.e., considered as an artifact of the intent conflict detection algorithm, or results of normal operations) can be properly filtered out by the filtering process, and therefore, more interesting and significant intent conflicts get the deserved attention.
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2.3

Analysis of Intent Conflicts

Using the rules defined in the previous section, the cutoff points for different tail
numbers can be computed, and the size of the intent conflict data can be reduced by
disregarding the intent conflicts with durations less than the cutoff values, as shown in
Table 2-4. This results in a significant increase in the number of flights that do not
exhibit any intent conflicts. In addition, the average number of intent conflicts detected
in each fight sharply decreases as the result of the filtering process. The change in the
distribution of the number of intent conflicts per flight is shown in Figure 2-7.
While a duration based filtering can reduce the number of the intent conflicts that
need be analyzed, manual analysis by SMEs is still not plausible. The goal of this thesis
is present a process to systematically analyze the intent conflicts identified in a set of
FOQA data by the intent conflict detection algorithm. The proposed approach is composed of two parts: First, clustering is used to group similar intent conflicts together
and systematically reduce the size of the dataset. Second, results from the clustering are
converted into a data-driven model that characterizes trends in intent conflicts. The
overall framework of the proposed algorithm is presented in Figure 2-8.
Table 2-4. Intent conflicts before and after filtering
Original
Total Flights
Vertical
Horizontal
Vertical
Mean intent conflicts
per flight
Horizontal
Flights with at least 1 conflict
Flights with no conflicts
Intent Conflicts

Filtered
151,083

1,134,737
3,189,431
7.51
21.51
147,885 (97.88%)
3,197 (2.22%)

288,624
780,830
1.95
5.17
118,196 (78.23%)
32,887 (21.77%)

17

Figure 2-7. Distribution of number of intent conflicts observed per flight before and after the filtering process

Figure 2-8. Overall framework of the proposed approach
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3.

PROPOSED CLUSTERING APPROACH

Consider a set of initial data points, or in this case intent conflict events, X. Traditional clustering approaches apply a clustering algorithm Φ to generate the set of solution clusters λ. While numerous such approaches exist, they are especially limited when
clustering heterogeneous sets of data made of both continuous and discrete state information. Thus we propose a multi-step consensus-based clustering approach. Within a
consensus based approach, a series of clustering algorithms {Φ(1) , Φ(2) , … , Φ(𝑁) } are
applied to generate multiple sets of solution clusters {𝜆(1) , 𝜆(2) , … , 𝜆(𝑁) }. These solution
clusters are then processed using a consensus function, 𝛤, to generate the final set of
solution clusters. The consensus-based approach is thus a multi-step process that combines information from multiple clustering solutions to generate superior results [17].
The proposed multi-step process can be broken down into three steps: feature analysis, primary clustering and consensus clustering. The details of the multi-step clustering process are illustrated in Figure 3-1 and will be discussed in this section.
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Figure 3-1. Detailed overview of consensus clustering

3.1

Feature Analysis

Due to the large number of flight parameters within the FOQA data and the inherent
uniqueness of each individual flight, it is extremely difficult to cluster and classify the
intent conflict events using the FOQA data as is. To simplify the dataspace, FOQA data
corresponding to intent conflict events is abstracted into a set of markers, known as
features, that characterize the properties of each intent conflict. these features are selected by applying domain knowledge regarding the process used to infer the pilot’s
and the autopilot’s intents in [16]. As a result of featuring, intent conflict data (𝑒) can
𝑗

be represented by a vector of 𝑁 features 𝑒𝑖 = (𝐹𝑖1 , 𝐹𝑖2 , … , 𝐹𝑖𝑁 ), where 𝐹𝑖 is the parameter value of the 𝑗-th feature for the 𝑖-th data point (i.e. the 𝑖-th identified intent conflict).
This process greatly reduces the unique nature of the FOQA data for each intent conflict
and generalizes it in the feature space. As such, millions of unique FOQA data events
are reduced to a handful of feature based events.
The features selected for clustering intent conflicts can be categorized as one of the
following three: intent conflict data features, continuous state features, and discrete
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state features. The details of each of these feature categories are detailed in the following subsections.
3.1.1

Intent Conflict Features

Information for features in this category is derived from the result of the intent conflict detection algorithm. These features provide information regarding the nature of the
intent conflict. Features in this category are based on the conclusions drawn by the
intent conflict algorithm and thus contain information that is not directly present in the
FOQA data. There are 4 features that are created using this data, as listed in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1. Features derived from intent conflict data from HMI algorithm
Feature

Description

Duration

Represent the length of time of the intent conflict. This feature is used to
distinguish between intent conflicts that vary in length

Relative Duration

Relative Start Time
Conflict Type

3.1.2

Represents the duration of the intent conflict as compared to the length of
the flight, normalized between 0 and 1.
Represents the location of the start of the intent conflict based on the
length of the flight, normalized between 0 and 1. This feature is used to
identify intent conflicts that occur during specific phases of the flight (ex:
take-off)
Discussed in section 1.1

Continuous Flight Data Features

These set of features are derived using information from continuous states in the
FOQA data during the period of the intent conflict. These features provide us with information regarding the motion of the aircraft when the intent conflict happened. The
main continuous state features are shown in Table 3-2.
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Table 3-2. Features derived from continuous state FOQA data

3.1.3

Data Source

Feature

Pressure Altitude

Mean Altitude
Mean Rate of Climb

Calibrated Air Speed

Mean Air Speed
Mean Acceleration

Heading Angle
Roll Angle

Mean Turn Rate
Turn Type (Left/Right)

Discrete State Features

These features are built using information regarding the autopilot modes and the pilot’s interactions with the Mode Control Panel (MCP). These features provide insight
into the actions taken by the pilot and the autopilot that lead to the intent conflict. Discrete state features differ from the previously discussed features in that they do not
represent measured quantities, instead they are used to track the actions of the pilot and
the autopilot during the intent conflict. This is done by looking at the sequence of discrete state changes that occur during the intent conflict. Discrete state data is converted
into features as follows (illustrated in Figure 3-2):
1. Start Trigger: This denotes the state of the discrete mode immediately prior and
immediate after the start of the intent conflict. Thus from Figure 3-2, the start
trigger feature for the illustrated example would be (5-5).
2. Conflict Sequence: This indicates the sequence of discrete mode changes that
take place during the conflict. Only instances when the discrete mode changes
are considered, i.e. the conflict sequence for Figure 3-2 would be (5-2).
3. Switching Frequency: This presents the total number of discrete state switches
during an intent conflict divided by the time duration between the first and the
last switch. Since the conflict sequence abandons time series information regard-
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ing the discrete states, this feature facilitates differencing between intent conflicts with rapid discrete state changes and those with more stable discrete state
changes. The switching frequency of the (5-2) conflict sequence in the example
would be 0. There must be at least 2 switches, meaning 3 discrete states, for this
measure to have a non-zero value.
4. End Trigger: This denotes the discrete mode transition at the end of the intent
conflict. In the example, the end trigger would be (2-3).
Both the start and end triggers always contain two discrete state values while the
length of the conflict sequence can vary depending on the total number of discrete state
transitions during the period of the intent conflict.

Figure 3-2. Illustration of discrete state information

The main discrete state data used to create discrete state features is shown in Table
3-3. In each case, the discrete state sequence is split into the start trigger, the conflict
sequence and, the end trigger.

Data
Source

Table 3-3. Data source for discrete state sequence information
Autopilot

Pilot

Vertical Flight Mode (VMODE)
Lateral Flight Mode (HMODE)
Thrust Mode (TMODE)
Flight Phase

MCP Target Altitude
MCP Target Airspeed
MCP Target Heading
-

The use of start and end triggers facilitates the clustering analysis based on the type
of mode switches that initiated or resolved the intent conflict. A discrete state is said to
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have triggered an intent conflict if the start of an intent conflict is marked by a change
in that discrete state. Inversely, if a change in a discrete state coincides with the end of
an intent conflict, it is said to have resolved the intent conflict.
Table 3-4 shows that the pilot’s action of changing the MCP target altitude results in
approximately 37% of the intent conflicts in the vertical dimension, compared to 15%
for VMODE. In comparison, the change in the VMODE is responsible for 85% intent
conflict resolutions, significantly higher than the 7% for the MCP target altitude.
Changes in flight phase only result in a minute number of triggers, both start and end.
This means that a large number of intent conflicts are initiated without any actions from
the pilot or the autopilot but the majority of them are resolved as a result of their intervention. The majority of intent conflicts also do not contain switches in discrete states
with only 8% in MCP target altitude, 23% in VMODE and 4% in flight phase. Discrete
state features can provide a causal relationship between intent conflict events and pilot
and autopilot actions. The high correlation between discrete state changes and intent
conflict justifies the use of the proposed discrete state features.
Table 3-4. Intent conflicts and discrete mode sequences in the vertical dimension
(1,134,737 total intent conflicts)

MCP Target Altitude
VMODE
Flight phase

3.1.3.1

Intent conflicts triggered

Intent conflicts
resolved

Intent conflicts w/
switching

419,877
175,035
1157

84,419
967,881
2467

88,125
265,491
46,307

Abstraction of MCP Target Sequences

MCP target sequences (altitude, speed, and heading) represent the discrete actions
of the pilot. Table 3-5 shows that the number of unique sequence in which the MCP
target altitude changed during intent conflicts is order of magnitudes higher than that
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for autopilot discrete states features. This trend in the data is observed for both MCP
target airspeed and heading sequences. While the autopilot discrete states switch between a finite numbers of modes, the pilot is able to select continuous values as a target.
As a result, a change in the target altitude from 10,000 ft to 6,000 ft is a distinct event
as compared to the change from 10,000 ft to 7,000 ft.
Table 3-5. Unique switching events for discrete mode sequences in the vertical dimension

MCP Target Altitude
VMODE
Flight phase

Unique Start Triggers
11,137
72
18

Unique End Triggers
6,908
70
17

Unique Sequences
28,245
748
130

While it is important to keep as much information as possible in the clustering process, to maintain each unique value for the MCP target sequential information would
be computationally infeasible and create a large number of spurious clusters and actually degrade the results of the clustering process. The actions taken by the pilot are of
greater importance than the individual values of different MCP targets. As such, the
sequential information from the MCP target value is abstracted to represent the action
taken by the pilot. There were two types of abstraction processes that are considered, a
simple up-down based abstraction and a level sensitive process.
3.1.3.1.1

Up-Down Abstraction

This method converts the MCP target value sequence into a series of (1) and (-1)
trailing being a 0. The first value of any sequence is assigned the state (0). The state of
subsequent value is dependent on the previous value. This can be represented as follows
𝑎𝑖 = 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑉𝑖 − 𝑉𝑖−1 )

(1)

where, 𝑎𝑖 is abstraction of the i-th value in the sequence of length n, 𝑉𝑖 is the value of
the i-th element of the sequence of length n 𝑎1 has a value of 0 for all sequences.
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Thus, using this method, a decrease in the MCP target value is considered as (-1)
while an increase is denoted with (1). Thus the pilot’s intents can be abstracted to a
simple go-up/go-down model.
3.1.3.1.2

Level Sensitive Abstraction

The Up-Down abstraction only looks at the immediate previous value of the MCP
target. A more detailed approach is to look at the range of all previous values in the
sequence and determine the relative levels to which the pilot programed the MCP. As
with the previous method, the first value in a sequence is automatically assigned a value
of (0). An increase in value compared to the immediate prior value is assigned a positive
integer while a decrease is assigned a negative integer. The magnitude and sign of this
integer can be determined by the following formulation
𝑖−2

𝑎𝑖 = 𝑆 ∑ 𝐻[𝑆 × 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑉𝑖 − 𝑉𝑗 )] ∙ 𝐻[𝑆 × 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑉𝑗 − 𝑉𝑖−1 )]

(2)

𝑗=1

𝑆 = 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑉𝑖 − 𝑉𝑖−1 )

(3)

where, 𝑎𝑖 is abstraction of the i-th value in the sequence of length n, 𝑉𝑖 is the value of
the i-th element of the sequence of length n, 𝑎1 has a value of 0 for all sequences, and
𝐻[𝑥] is the Heaviside step function.
The above algorithm is able to identify the relative increase of the MCP value in
comparison with the previous levels that have been recorded. While the previous
method only looks at the generic up/down changes in the MCP target value, resulting
in a loss of information regarding the multiple levels in the MCP target value change.
The comparison in the abstracted sequences derived from the application of both methods can be seen in Table 3-6. Table 3-7 shows that the number of unique sequences can
be significantly reduced by both methods. This also helps outline the fact that, once
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abstracted, pilot actions with regards to the MCP target value are significantly less diverse as compared to the autopilot actions (see Table 3-5). The use of the level sensitive
techniques allows us to capture more information regarding the general intentions of
the pilot.
Table 3-6. Example of abstraction of MCP altitude target sequences
MCP Target Altitude
10,000→7,000→8,000
10,000→7,000→11,000
10,000→7,000→11,000→9,000

Up-Down Abstraction
0→-1→1→-1
0→-1→1→-1
0→-1→1→-1

Level Sensitive Abstraction
0→-1→1→-2
0→-1→2→-2
0→-1→2→-2

Table 3-7. Number of unique sequences in MCP altitude target
Original Sequence
28,245

3.2

Up-Down Abstraction
22

Level Sensitive Abstraction
31

Primary Clustering

While it is possible to cluster intent conflict across multiple feature dimensions at
once, doing so results I n a loss of specificity. Due to the coupled nature of many of the
flight parameters, a multi-dimensional clustering effort leads to large trivial clusters
that provide no additional information regarding trends in intent conflict. To circumvent
this, intent conflicts are separately clustered along each of the 𝑁 features, denoted by
𝛷 (𝑘) (𝑒𝑖 ) = 𝑙𝑖𝑘

(4)

where, Φ(𝑘) is the clustering function employed to cluster data with regards to the
𝑘-th feature and 𝑙𝑖𝑘 is the corresponding cluster label for the 𝑖-th data point and
𝑙𝑖𝑘 ∈ {𝜆1𝑘 , 𝜆𝑘2 , … , 𝜆𝑘𝑚𝑘 }

(5)

where, 𝜆𝑗𝑘 is the cluster label of the 𝑗-th cluster and 𝑚𝑘 is the total number of clusters
along the 𝑘-th feature created by Φ(𝑘) .
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Based on the characteristics of each feature, different clustering algorithms must be
used. For the features used within the scope of this work, one of these three techniques
is used; DBSCAN [19], Jenks Natural Breaks [20] or k-median [21]. The DBSCAN
takes a density based approach to clustering and is employed to cluster both continuous
and discrete state features. Due to its ability to handle oddly shaped distribution, the
DBSCAN is found to be an effective technique to generate the primary clusters. In the
Jenks Natural Breaks approach, originally developed to be used in cartography, an iterative process is applied to evaluate different breaks within the data and cluster the
data to achieve the smallest in class variance. This approach is used to cluster the intent
conflict duration feature, values for which exhibit an exponential distribution with a
heavy tail. The k-median clustering algorithm is used to cluster the two normalized
time-based features; whose values range from 0 to 1. Note that a median based approach
was selected over k-means [22] to create clusters that are more compact.
Intent conflict events can now be represented by the cluster labels along 𝑁 features
rather than the original parameter value of the feature; 𝑒𝑖 = (𝑙𝑖1 , 𝑙𝑖2 , … , 𝑙𝑖𝑁 ). A primary
cluster is then defined as the set of intent conflict events that share the same feature
labels across all the features as:
𝑃𝐶𝑘 = {𝑒 ∈ 𝐸|𝑒𝑖 = 𝑒𝑗 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2, … , |𝐸|}}

(6)

where 𝐸 is the set of all intent conflicts and |𝐸| is the cardinality of 𝐸. Then the set of
primary clusters is:
𝑃𝐶 = {𝑃𝐶1 , 𝑃𝐶2 , 𝑃𝐶3 , … , 𝑃𝐶𝑀 },
(7)
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝐶𝑖 ∩ 𝑃𝐶𝑗 = ∅, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑀]
where 𝑀 is the total number of primary clusters.
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Each primary cluster represents a set of intent conflict events that have comparable
features, that is events within the same primary cluster occur under a limited spread in
flight parameters. The primary clustering in and by itself is able to aggregate intent
conflicts based on their general flight parameters. However, if we were to stop here, it
would result in clusters which are too specific for our use. Intent conflicts contained
within each primary cluster only apply to a limited range of flight conditions. This outcome is the opposite of what is obtained when clustering across multiple feature dimensions; which, as noted above, caused a total loss of specificity. To find a balance between these two outcomes, we use consensus clustering to aggregate the results of the
primary clusters.
3.2.1

Distance Measure for Discrete Sequences

The discrete state sequences hold critical information regarding the pilot and autopilot actions during an intent conflict and must be accounted for in the clustering process.
The DBSCAN method usually uses Euclidian distances to cluster the input dataset
which are not appropriate for measuring the distance between a set of discrete state
sequences. As such, a new technique based on pattern matching is proposed to measure
the distance between two discrete sequences. In the vertical domain, the discrete sequences include the VMODE sequence, flight phase sequence and the MCP target altitude sequence associated with an intent conflict.
A popular technique used to find similarities between discrete state sequences is the
Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) approach [23]. While this approach was initially
considered, the LCS algorithm views non-continuous sequences as valid subsequence
solutions. For example, as per the LCS approach the longest subsequence between the
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sequences ‘AXBYCZ’ and ‘XYZ’ is the subsequence ‘XYZ” with a length of 3. However, when looking at discrete sequences within intent conflicts themselves, it is more
important to analyze the series of continuous actions that were taken during an intent
conflict.
The Levenshtein distance [24] is a popular measure that is used in computer science
to identify the minimum number of changes required to convert one string (i.e. sequence
of characters) to another. This method can be applied to find the distance between a
pair of discrete state sequences. However, the Levenshtein distance is unable to take
into consideration the existence of repeated sequence of characters and is better suited
when the sequences are of similar lengths.
Another technique that was considered is the BLAST algorithm [25], used to match
nucleotide sequences. This algorithm works by using a library shortened query sequences that can be compared between the input string and its internal library. While
this process is effective even for extremely large sequence, it is excessive for the shorter
sequence (shorter compared to the length of nucleotides) that are encountered in this
case. This approach is able to account for repetition in discrete states.
A new method is therefore proposed to calculate the distance between two discrete
state sequences. This distance between two sequences can be considered as the measure
of similarity in the actions taken within the sequences. This can be used to quantify how
similar the response of the pilot or the automation was under a given intent conflict.
The algorithm developed is illustrated in Figure 3-3.
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Figure 3-3. Distance measure algorithm for discrete sequences

The algorithm attempts to identify all the exclusive alignments that exist between
the two sequences. An exclusive alignment is defined as a match between sequences 1
and 2 such that the elements in sequence 1 currently aligned have not previously aligned
to elements in sequence 2. If there exist two positions where the same elements in sequence 1 align with a set of elements in sequence 2, then the shorter of the two positions
is discarded. This technique prohibits multiple matching of the elements in sequence 1
to elements in sequence 2, while still allowing for repeated sequences. Once all the
unique positions have been identified, distance between the two sequences can then be
calculated using
𝑛

𝑑 =1−∑
𝑖=1

𝑙𝑖 𝑙𝑖
∙
𝐿1 𝐿2

(8)

where, 𝑛 is number of exclusive matches between sequence 1 and sequence 2, 𝑙𝑖 is
the length of the matched sequence 𝑖, and 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 are the lengths of sequence 1 and
sequence 2 respectively.
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Using this measure, the distances between a few samples of the VMODE sequences
are computed as shown in Table 3-8. A shorter distance signifies that the actions taken
in the two cases have a high level of similarity. The value for this measure can vary
from 0 to 1, where 0 signifies an exact match while 1 represents a complete mismatch.
Table 3-8. Sample discrete sequence distances (smaller is closer)
Sequence 1
787017870
787017870
787017870
787017870
787017870
787017870

Sequence 2
13232
78
787
7870
78701
787017870

Distance
1
0.4444
0.3333
0.1111
0.0889
0

Looking back at the LCS approach and let us consider the sequences (1-2-3-4-5-6)
and (1-2-3). The distance between these 2 sequences using the LCS subsequence approach and the proposed distance algorithm would be 0.5. Now consider the sequences
(1-2-3-4-5-6) and (1-3-5), the LCS approach would still give a subsequence match of 3
and thus a distance of 0.5. However, the proposed approach results in three individual
matches of length 1 and consequently a distance of 0.167.

3.3

Consensus Clustering

Let us consider an example where data is clustered along three features, with each
feature being grouped into two clusters, and forming three primary clusters. The result
of this primary clustering can be envisioned as a hypergraph, with the three primary
clusters (𝑃𝐶1 , 𝑃𝐶2 , 𝑃𝐶3 ) represented as vertices and the individual cluster labels (𝜆 =
{𝜆11 , 𝜆12 , 𝜆12 , 𝜆22 , 𝜆13 , 𝜆32 }) as the edges, as illustrated in Figure 3-4. In this figure, primary
cluster 𝑃𝐶1 is assigned to cluster 𝜆11 along the first feature, 𝜆22 along the second feature

32
and 𝜆32 along the third; and therefore lies within the intersection of the edges representing those three clusters.

Figure 3-4. Illustration of primary clusters as a hypergraph

The consensus function is the algorithm that operates on this hypergraph to create
consensus clusters. One such consensus function would be to use hypergraph partitioning (HGP) by cutting a subset of the edges and thus dividing the hypergraph [17, 26,
27]. However, this approach is most effective when the desired number of clusters is
known and are of similar size. As this assumption cannot be made, we reframe the
hypergraph as a similarity matrix. Within this similarity matrix, the pairwise similarity
between the 𝑖-th and the 𝑗-th primary clusters is the cardinality of the intersection of the
sets of their cluster labels, given by:
𝑆𝑖𝑗 = |𝑃𝐶𝑖𝜆 ∩ 𝑃𝐶𝑗𝜆 |

(9)

where 𝑃𝐶𝑖𝜆 is the set containing the cluster labels shared by the intent conflict events
within 𝑃𝐶𝑖 ; for the example in Figure 3-4, 𝑃𝐶1𝜆 = {𝜆11 , 𝜆22 , 𝜆32 } and 𝑃𝐶2𝜆 = {𝜆12 , 𝜆12 , 𝜆32 },
thus 𝑆12 is given by |{𝜆11 , 𝜆22 , 𝜆32 } ∩ {𝜆12 , 𝜆12 , 𝜆32 }| and is equal to 1. The values in the similarity matrix represent the number of feature labels that the primary clusters share.
Since similarity is not directional, i.e. 𝑆𝑖𝑗 = 𝑆𝑗𝑖 , the similarity matrix is symmetric.
Using this, it is possible to construct the similarity matrix for the primary clusters.
The consensus function used in this thesis is a matrix partitioning algorithm that divides
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this similarity matrix into consensus clusters, illustrated in Figure 3-5. Specifically, we
apply an iterative k-medoids method to partition the similarity matrix into consensus
clusters [27, 28]. The k-medoids clustering method then generates consensus clusters
by grouping together similar primary clusters.

Figure 3-5. Illustration of the partitioning of the similarity matrix into consensus clusters

The output of the clustering process is consensus clusters with each consensus cluster containing a set of primary clusters. Data within each of these consensus clusters
represent events that are similar to each other and dissimilar to those in other clusters.
The intent conflict events making up the primary clusters within a consensus cluster
show a high level of agreement with each other and are said to have high consensus.
When two intent conflict events have high consensus, most of their features will be
similar to each other; that is, the two intent conflicts will describe comparable flight
characteristics. However, simply putting such events together does not yield any insight
into the nature of the consensus clusters. To solve this, we propose using the results of
the consensus algorithm to build a data driven model that can systematically represent
the identified trends in the intent conflicts.
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4.

DATA-DRIVEN MODEL

This modeling process is built around the notion of expressing consensus clusters as
networks. The structure of these networks provides an intuitive understanding of the
relationships between the intent conflicts represented by a consensus cluster. Once this
network has been created, its contents can be generalized by a representative event.
This approach also allows the model to be efficiently updated when new data is available.

4.1

Clusters as Networks

Each consensus cluster is created by partitioning a large similarity matrix, and thus
each of them has a similarity matrix associated with themselves. This similarity matrix
can be converted into a dissimilarity matrix by a simple transformation. The dissimilarity matrix denotes how far away the events within a consensus cluster are from each
other.
Figure 4-1 shows the matrices associated with a consensus cluster, of 7 primary clusters labeled A-G as an example. Assume that, when performing consensus clustering, a
total of 12 features are used, making 12 the maximum possible value within the similarity matrix. The dissimilarity matrix is the similarity matrix with its values subtracted
from this maximum value of 12, i.e. 𝔻ij = 12 − 𝕊ij , where 𝔻ij and 𝕊ij denote the element in the i-th row and the j-th column of 𝔻 and 𝕊, respectively. The dissimilarity
matrix is always 0 along its diagonal and also is symmetric.
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The dissimilarity matrix can then be transformed to a weighted adjacency matrix by
setting all the non-zero values in a row above the minimum non-zero value in the same
row to zero, thereby only preserving the nearest connections. This adjacency matrix is
used to generate a networked graph, as shown in Figure 4-2, which better shows the
relations between different primary clusters within a consensus cluster. All the intent
conflicts within a consensus cluster already have high consensus with each other, but
by looking only at the closest set of relationship a clearer picture of the connections
within the consensus cluster can be realized.

Figure 4-1. Similarity, dissimilarity and adjacency matrices of a sample consensus cluster

Figure 4-2. Graph plot for the sample consensus cluster in Figure 4-1

4.2

Representative Event

The goal of this work is to ensure that intent conflicts are clustered to enable efficient
analysis by SMEs. The intent conflicts grouped within a consensus cluster can be described as a set of events that are similar to each other along most of the features. From
Figure 4-2, we can say that events in primary cluster B are a variation of events in C
which are a variation of events in A which are a variation of events in F, and so on. The
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distance between two nodes, i.e. weight of the edges along the shortest path between
them, determines the number of features along which events within those nodes vary.
By the concept of variations, we can identify the dominant node (i.e., primary cluster) within a consensus cluster. The dominant node is defined as one with the least
amount of dissimilarity to the rest of the nodes in the network. Within a consensus
cluster, the dominant node is selected as the one with the lowest centrality score as
defined by,
𝑤𝑖 = 𝜖(𝑖) ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗

(10)

𝑗

where 𝑗 ranges from 1 to the size of the dissimilarity matrix, and 𝜖(𝑖) is the eccentricity
of the 𝑖-th node and is defined as the greatest geodesic distance between node 𝑖 and any
other node. The summation term in Eq. (10) is used to calculate the total dissimilarity
a node has within the network. The eccentricity term is used to weigh nodes that minimize the radius of the graph more favorably. The radius of the graph is equal to the
minimum eccentricity of the nodes in a network. For example, in Figure 4-2 the nodes
A, D, E, and F have an eccentricity of 2, while nodes B, C, and G have an eccentricity
of 3. Thus the radius of this graph is 2. A lower eccentricity score indicates that a node
is closer to the center of the graph, defined as the set of nodes with the minimum eccentricity. Thus in this case, while nodes A, D, E and F are at the center of the graph;
however, since node A has the minimum total dissimilarity, it is the dominant node. In
the case where multiple nodes have the minimum centrality score, the size of a node
(i.e. the number of intent conflicts represented by that primary cluster) is used as a tiebreaker for selecting the dominant node.
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Even though a consensus cluster represents events grouped non-quantitatively, using
the above measure, we can identify the most dominant node within the consensus cluster. The intent conflict events that are clustered within the dominant node, are said to
be the representative events of the consensus cluster. The rest of the intent conflicts
within the consensus cluster are considered to be variations of these representative
events. The representative events showcase the general properties of the intent conflicts
within a consensus cluster and therefore the general flight condition under which the
events in that consensus cluster occur. The variations from the representative events
can be considered as instances when the representative intent conflict occurred but under slightly different flight conditions (for example, at a different altitude).
This process effectively represents the results of consensus clusters, facilitating the
simpler analysis of the information consolidated within a consensus cluster. While examining intent conflicts, the properties of the representative event can be reviewed first
to gauge the general characteristics of the consensus cluster. Then, if necessary, the rest
of the variations may be examined. The networked consensus clusters and their representative property together create a data driven model for intent conflicts.

4.3

Model Update

It is important that the model proposed in the previous section can be updated when
new flight data is available, to account for the emergence of new variations in known
intent conflicts, entirely new types of intent conflicts, or simply an increase in frequency
of a particular type of intent conflict. The clustering approach employed in this thesis
and the subsequent definition of a model make it simple and efficient to perform this
update. This update process is carried out in the following three steps. First, the value
for each of the features of the new data point is compared to the existing feature clusters.
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For each feature, if the new value is within the parameters of an existing cluster, it is
assigned the corresponding cluster label without the need to perform clustering along
that feature. When this happens, it is said that the value for that particular feature was
previously observed by the model. When the feature of the new data point does not fall
in the limits of the existing feature clusters, a new cluster is formed around the new data
point. In this manner, new data does not modify the contents or structure of an existing
feature cluster.
Second, based on its feature cluster labels, the new data point is assigned to a primary
cluster. If the new data point has the same cluster labels as an existing primary cluster,
it is said to be a known event and the corresponding primary and consensus clusters are
updated to include it. If this is not the case, a new primary cluster is created and the
overall similarity matrix updated. However, it is not necessary to re-partition the entire
similarity matrix. The partitioning of the similarity matrix creates consensus clusters
that maximize internal similarity, so partitioning the entire updated similarity matrix
will only result in a different solution for those consensus clusters that are highly similar
to the new primary cluster. Therefore, only the consensus clusters that have a high similarity with this new primary cluster need to be reformed, which is a desirable property
from the computational complexity point of view
Third, the model is updated to reflect any changes in the structure or the size of the
new consensus clusters. This update process may result in modifying, combining or
expanding the existing consensus clusters. Any changes to a consensus clusters also
trigger a revaluation of the dominant node in order to ensure that a consensus cluster is
represented correctly. An example of how a model may be updated with new intent
conflict data is discussed in the next subsection.
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4.3.1

Model Update Example

Table 4-1 shows the features of an example intent conflict that is to be checked
against the model built using the intent conflict data from tail #661. These features
represent an intent lag conflict (Type 1) occurring when the autopilot enters the altitude
capture mode when descending towards a given altitude.
When this intent conflict is compared to the model, it is found that only one of the
features (VMODE Sequence) is unknown to the model. While this exact intent conflict
event has never been observed by the model, the model does contain knowledge regarding which primary clusters some of the features (in this case, all except VMODE
sequence) belong within. As such, only VMODE Sequence must be clustered to identify its native primary cluster.
In this case, the clustering process identifies that the unknown VMODE Sequence
lies within the same cluster as the VMODE sequence 1→3. This relation is due to the
small ‘distance’ between the two discrete sequences (as defined by the discrete sequence distance algorithm).
Since the clusters for the entire feature space have been identified, they are used to
build consensus and the intent conflict can be assigned to a primary cluster. In this case,
this new event has complete consensus with the existing cluster as shown in Table 4-1.
Thus, even though the event described was not previously recorded, it was possible to
classify it within an existing cluster and find a complete consensus with existing events.
In this case, a model updated the properties of a consensus cluster without changing the
structure of the consensus cluster.

40
Table 4-1. Feature data for an intent conflict being added to the model
Features

Value

Model
Knowledge

Consensus with

Conflict Type

2 – Intent Delay Conflict

Known

2

VMODE Trigger
VMODE Resolve
VMODE Sequence

1→1 (Altitude Auto)
3 (Alt Capture) → 2 (Alt Hold)
1→3→1→3

Known
Known
Unknown

1→1
3→2
1→3

TMODE
Phase
MCP Target Altitude Sequence
Speed Target Value Sequence
Pilot Trigger

10 – Constant Speed Mode
6 – Descent Mode
Constant
Constant
Descent → Hold

Known
Known
Known
Known
Known

10
6
Constant
Constant
Descent → Hold
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5.

DEMONSTRATION OF PROPOSED ALGORITHMS WITH
FOQA DATASET
The algorithms proposed in this thesis were applied to the FOQA data from 151,083

flights in the NASA’s DASHlink database. For each flight, intent conflicts were first
detected by applying the intent conflict detection algorithm proposed in [16]. The detected intent conflicts were then analyzed by our proposed approach, with the results of
those analysis discussed in this section. The results are presented in a manner that
demonstrates the capabilities and effectiveness of the proposed approach.

5.1

Trends in Intent Conflicts

Intent conflicts detected in the vertical/speed and horizontal/speed (H/S) dimensions
were processed using our approach, and the results of which are shown in Table 5-1.
Intent conflicts in the V/S dimension are detected based on the movement of the aircraft
in the longitudinal plane while those in the H/S dimension based on motion in the lateral
plane.
By looking at the distribution of intent conflicts along different features, it is possible
to identify overarching trends regarding their behavior. Figure 5-1 shows that intent
conflicts in the vertical/speed (V/S) dimension are highly prevalent during the descent
stage of the flight. Additionally, Figure 5-2 shows the distribution on V/S intent conflicts over the duration of the flight. In this case, as expected a peak is observed towards
the end of the flight. Both of this behavior is in agreement with industry surveys that
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conclude that aviation accidents are concentrated during Final Approach and Landing
[29].
Intent conflicts in the H/S dimensions are almost evenly distributed across the three
major phases in flight, as shown in Figure 5-3. Furthermore, while H/S intent conflicts
are slightly more prevalent during the beginning and the end of a flight as seen in Figure
5-4; the distribution doesn’t contain high concentrations in specific regions of the flight
as is the case with intent conflicts in the V/S dimensions.

Figure 5-1. Distribution of V/S intent conflicts by flight phase
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Figure 5-2. Distribution of V/S intent conflicts by normalized flight time

Figure 5-3. Distribution of H/S intent conflicts by flight phase
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Figure 5-4. Distribution of H/S intent conflicts by normalized flight time

5.2

Data Reduction

The objective of the clustering process is to systematically reduce the size of data
that must be analyzed by SMEs. To demonstrate the capabilities of our approach, we
applied the proposed algorithms to intent conflicts detected in the aforementioned data
set.
Each step of the clustering process significantly reduces the size of the data, with the
ultimate size being orders of magnitude smaller than the initial dataset. In the V/S dimension a total of 288,624 intent conflicts were detected in a dataset of 151,083 flights.
Within the proposed multi-step clustering process, each step of the process was able to
reduce the results of the previous step with consensus clustering compressing the number down to 74 by the final step. Consequently, instead of attempting to analyze a few
hundred thousand events, SMEs only need to analyze only 74 clusters to identify HMI
related intent conflicts. Similar results were obtained by analyzing intent conflicts from
the same flight data in the H/S dimension.
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Table 5-1. Data reduction capability of proposed clustering approach

Intent Conflicts
Filtered Events
Featured Events
Primary Clusters
Consensus Clusters

5.3

Vertical/Speed
Size of events
% of original
1,134,737
100%
288,624
25.43%
2,984
0.26%
641
0.0056%
74
0.000065%

Horizontal/Speed
Size of events
% of original
3,189,431
100%
780,830
24.48%
3,217
0.10%
918
0.0031%
92
0.000029%

Properties of Identified Consensus Clusters

In this section, we will outline some of the insights a consensus cluster can provide
into the nature of intent conflict events. For brevity, we will focus on the results from
the analysis of intent conflicts in the V/S dimension. Table 5-2 lists the properties of a
few of the 74 consensus clusters that were created by the proposed clustering process.
By looking at this table, it is possible to infer the type of intent conflicts that each of
the consensus cluster represents.
The consistency of a consensus cluster is the percentage of feature labels that are
identical across all the intent conflicts within that consensus cluster. The consistent features of a consensus cluster represent the features and the associated parameter values
that are always observed when that type of intent conflict occurs. Consequently, these
consistent parameters can be viewed as the circumstance in flight that triggers that intent conflict. Clusters with low consistency represent intent conflict events that may
occur in a range of flight conditions while those with high consistency suggest that
specific things must occur for that type of intent conflict to happen. The number of
primary clusters in a consensus cluster represent the total number of variations of the
intent conflict in the consensus cluster. This measure provides insight into the width of
variations that still facilitate the intent conflict. Features that vary within a consensus
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clusters indicate that the occurrence of an intent conflict may not be dependent on those
features.
Table 5-2. Properties of consensus clusters on V/S intent conflicts
Consensus Clusters

Consensus Cluster 1

Feature
Consistency

58%

# of Primary
Clusters

63

# of intent
conflicts

Features with Variations

82,472

Altitude
Altitude Rate
TMODE
Flight Phase
Relative Start Time

Consensus Cluster 2

66%

34

36,781

Altitude
MCP Altitude Target
Flight Phase
Relative Start Time

Consensus Cluster 30

75%

12

7,123

MCP Alt Target
TMODE
Flight Phase

Consensus Cluster 40

83%

7

1,146

Altitude
VMODE

Consensus Cluster 50

83%

3

121

MCP Altitude Target
Flight Phase

Consensus Cluster 53

83%

6

87

Altitude
Duration

Consensus Cluster 60
Consensus Cluster 70

100%
100%

1
1

5
1

-

Using this, we can infer properties about different consensus clusters. For example,
the consensus clusters that do not show variation along the altitude feature (30, 50, 60,
70 in Table 5-2) represent intent conflicts that only happen within a fixed range of altitudes. Subsequently, the consensus clusters that show a variation in flight phase but not
altitude (30, 50) represent intent conflicts that occur in situations where there is a
change in flight phase, such as transitions in and out of cruise. By looking at consensus
clusters as such, it is possible to deduce which consensus clusters could represent intent
conflicts of an interesting nature.
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5.4

Benefits of the Proposed Network Structure

In this subsection, we will showcase how a consensus cluster can be effectively visualized as a network. Once the details of the consensus cluster are identified, the network structure can be annotated as in Figure 5-5. By doing so, the relations between
the different features and primary clusters can be more clearly seen. For example, in
Figure 5-5, we can see how variations from the representative cluster, A, occur due to
variations in three different features. The network graph provides us with a visual tool
to understand how events within a consensus cluster relate to one and other.

Figure 5-5. Network graph of a consensus cluster

5.5

Details of Clustered Intent Conflicts

In this subsection, we will analyze some of consensus clusters by looking at their
representative events. In each case, we will describe the conditions in flight that lead to
the intent conflicts. The proposed approach will demonstrate its ability to effectively
create cohesive clusters that provide valuable insight into their contents.
5.5.1

Example 1: Representative Intent Conflict of V/S Consensus Cluster 53

There are a total of 87 intent conflicts within this consensus cluster. The intent conflicts occur because there is a change in the autopilot intent from altitude hold (0) to
descend (-1), while the pilot maintains an altitude hold intent. This intent conflict is
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initiated by a change in the autopilot VMODE as the aircraft begins to descend. Events
within the consensus clusters vary due to altitude (mean of 2,000 ft and 4,000 ft) and
the length (mean of 45 seconds, 104 seconds and 186 seconds). In each case, the pilot
does not interact with the MCP and the autopilot switches TMODE from Speed Hold
(10) to Auto Throttle OFF (0) during the intent conflict. In addition, the autopilot makes
a series of VMODE changes of type shown in Figure 5-6. It is this series of VMODE
changes that make the events within this particular cluster of interest.
The autopilot VMODEs are defined as follows: 1-Altitude Auto, 2-Altitude Hold, 7Flare, 8-Land. During this intent conflict, the aircraft is making its final descent towards
the runway. Upon performing a review of standard landing operations within the data
set, the observed VMODE behavior for events within this consensus cluster is significantly different from a nominal approach, shown in Figure 5-9. In addition, by looking
at the start time of the intent conflicts normalized against the flight time, it can be seen
that intent conflicts within this consensus cluster happen almost exclusively during the
end stages of the flight, as shown in Figure 5-8.
We believe that events within this consensus cluster are of interest due to the rarity
of their occurrence, unique VMODE behavior and relationship with the landing operations.
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Figure 5-6. Flight parameters of a representative intent conflict for Consensus Cluster 53 in the
V/S dimension

Figure 5-7. Flight parameters during a nominal landing behavior
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Figure 5-8. Normalized location of intent conflicts from Consensus Cluster 53 during the flight

5.5.2

Example 2: Intent Conflict of V/S Consensus Cluster 70

Consensus cluster 70 consists of a single primary cluster containing a single intent
conflict, the details of which are shown in Figure 5-9. No other variations of this intent
conflict were observed within the dataset. The intent conflict begins when the pilot
starts making small changes to the MCP target altitude. These changes are being made
while the aircraft is descending for landing. These small changes made by the pilot
initiate an autopilot response for both the vertical and thrust modes. The autopilot performs a series of vertical mode switches, described in Figure 5-9. In addition, the thrust
mode also switches from Auto Throttle OFF (0) to Speed Hold (10). The rapid switching of modes suggests automation taking actions in an attempt to reach a stable state.
This situation also poses a potential danger as it occurs as just prior to landing.
It was found that the problem described by this intent conflict is indeed a known
HMI issue that results from pilot error [30]. This intent conflict occurred when the pilot
paused while turning the dial to set a missed approach altitude, which resulted in the
autopilot intermittently switching to Altitude Hold mode. This problem is described in
[30] as “Altitude Capture while Setting Missed Approach Altitude”. This example
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showcases that the proposed approach is able to identify, differentiate, and isolate a
singular event, in an unsupervised manner, within a dataset of 288,624 events.

Figure 5-9. Flight parameters of the intent conflict in Consensus Cluster #70 in the V/S dimension

5.5.3

Example 3: Representative Intent Conflict of V/S Consensus Cluster 30

Looking at the flight parameters during the intent conflict in the representative event,
the conflict occurs due to a delay in the autopilot following the pilot’s intent of reducing
altitude. As shown in Figure 5-10, while the aircraft is in cruise at a constant altitude
the pilot lowers the MCP target altitude to 24,000 ft (down from 28,000 ft). There is a
delay in the autopilot switching from Altitude Hold (VMODE 2) to Altitude Auto
(VMODE 1). The autopilot’s intent change happens after a significant period, 240 second, from when the pilot sets the MCP target. This long duration of the intent conflict
distinguishes this consensus cluster from other more common delay-type events. Another observation is that there do not exist variations in the altitude, as such the intent
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conflicts described within this consensus cluster happen at similar altitudes (approximately 27,000 ft to 31,000 ft). Using this information, it can be concluded that the intent
conflict described by this consensus cluster is of a specific nature and happens when
the aircraft begins its descent from cruise.
Upon discussion of such events with pilots, it was determined that these type of intent conflicts could be occurring due to the pilot preemptively selecting a MCP altitude
target without engaging it. Since the engagement information is not available in the
FOQA data, it is not possible to account for this during the intent inference. However,
the consensus clustering process is able to separate out this apparent intent conflict due
to normal operating procedures.

Figure 5-10. Flight parameters of a representative intent conflict for Consensus Cluster 30 in the
V/S dimension

5.5.4

Discussion of Consensus Clusters

The intent conflict detection algorithm uses intent inference to identify HMI issues
[16]. The algorithm detects intent conflict instances in flight that could potentially be a
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result of a HMI issue, however this is not always the case. Many of the identified consensus cluster were found to not represent an HMI issue but instead represent a false
positive due to noise or lack of some information in the data. The clustering approach
proposed in this thesis is capable of separating these false intent conflicts from the true
HMI issues.
Consider consensus cluster 30 from Table 5-2, upon analysis it was found that the
events within this consensus cluster were a result of a normal operation procedure that
cannot be captured by the information currently available in FOQA data. The intent
conflicts within this cluster represented a long duration (> 2 minutes) delay in the autopilot engaging when the pilot changes the MCP altitude target. The pilot tactically
sets the new altitude target before he actually intends to descend and engages this altitude change at latter time; resulting in an apparent HMI issue stemming from a delay
in action by the autopilot. Since the button press action to engage a new MCP target is
not recorded in the FOQA data, it is not possible to account for this in the pilot’s intent
model and thus it is erroneously identified as an intent conflict by the intent conflict
detection algorithm.
Events contained within consensus cluster 1 are also falsely identified as HMI issues
that result from the approximations made within the intent conflict detection algorithm.
The process of inferring the pilot intent uses a 120 ft bound around the target altitude,
a necessity to account for noise in the data. As such, the pilot intent is preemptively set
to Altitude Hold when the aircraft descends within this bounds but before it levels out,
leading to a falsely detected intent conflict. Consensus cluster 2 represents events of a
comparable situation except when the aircraft is climbing instead of descending.
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It is crucial to differentiate that while the events represented within a consensus cluster may not be true HMI issues, the consensus clusters themselves are not invalid. Ultimately, we can conclude that the proposed approach is indeed capable of segregating
different types of intent conflicts into consistent clusters. By analyzing large clusters
representing false intent conflicts, SMEs can discard significant numbers of events in
bulk. True HMI events and intent conflicts are rare events that are not expected to occur
with a high frequency. The proposed algorithm is effectively able to both identify
events that occur rarely, as described in the previous two examples, while still accounting for large clusters that represent false HMI events.

5.6

Model Validation

The model is validated to check its ability to categorize intent conflicts and improve
as it is updated with new data. An intent conflict data point is considered to be ‘known’
if it’s features have been previously observed within the model and thus it can be instantly categorized. An intent conflict is ‘unknown’ if it’s features are not part of the
model and the model must update itself to identify how to categorize this new event.
The FOQA dataset being used contains information from 35 aircraft identified with
their tail numbers. An initial model was generated by using data from tail number #661.
This model was then updated in 2 steps, first with data from flights of tail #662 and
then tail #663. The knowledge of each model was tested with flight data from the remainder of the tail numbers, the result of this are shown in Figure 5-11. When the intent
conflict model is created using flight data from just tail number #661, it is capable of
directly categorizing about 90% of the intent conflicts from the rest of the tail numbers.
Upon updating this model with data from tail #662, we can increase this rate up to 92%
and then close to 95% when intent conflict data from tail #663 is integrated.
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From Figure 5-11, it can be seen that the model’s ability to categorize events varies
from across the different tail numbers. For example, in the first case when the model is
created with data from only tail #661, tail #657 and 685 have a much lower rate of
recognition with the model than others. Upon integration of the data from tail #662, the
rate for #657 rises closer to the average. Intent conflicts observed in the data from tail
#662 also occurred in the flights of tail #657; thus when data from tail #662 is added to
the model, the model’s effectiveness in categorizing events from tail #657 increases.
For the flights from tail #685, the rate remains consistently lower than the average even
after the model is updated twice. This actually provides the insight that intent conflicts
occurring in the flights of that aircraft are of a potentially unique nature and of perspective interest.
The effectiveness of a data driven model is a direct consequence of the quality of the
initial training data used. The proposed data driven model is able to categorize intent
conflicts based on its existing knowledge. As the model is updated with more information, it has been shown that the model’s ability to categorize intent conflict, i.e. its
knowledge, grows.

Figure 5-11. Model knowledge of intent conflicts
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6.

CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis, we have developed a clustering and modeling algorithm to categorize
identified intent conflict events within large-scale Flight Operational Quality Assurance
(FOQA) dataset, to provide Subject Matter Experts a tool which enable efficient and
effective analysis of such events that would represent Human Machine Interaction
(HMI) issues. A multi-step clustering process has been proposed to cluster the intent
conflict data. The results of this clustering are then converted to an updateable model
with each cluster structured into a network. By applying this approach to a large-scale
FOQA dataset, it has been demonstrated that the proposed algorithm can create useful
clusters that can significantly simplify the analysis process. The model generated from
this process has shown to be able to identify intent conflicts based on its internal
knowledge and improve when updated with new data. Finally, it should be noted that
while the algorithms presented in this thesis has been developed for the analysis of
FOQA data, the underlying framework is domain agnostics and could be used in other
applications that are facing similar challenges.
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